Armed Forces Enlistment: The Use and
Abuse of Contract
Department of Defense Form 4--"Enlistment Contract-Armed
Forces of the United States,"-is, according to armed forces regulations,
"the basic document establishing a legal relationship"1 between an
enlistee 2 and the federal government. The courts have generally accepted the title of Form 4 at face value. They have viewed the relationship between enlistees and the armed forces as contractual and, therefore, essentially different from the relationship between the armed
forces and persons inducted through the Selective Service System. This
comment examines, first, the bases in precedent for the assumption
that every enlistment creates a contractual relationship. It then describes the practical consequences of this view. The courts have looked
to traditional contract rules to resolve disputes between enlistees and
the armed services, often in derogation of constitutional norms and
statutory requirements. In addition, they have found that enlistees
have certain contractual rights that serve to limit the power of both
the armed services and Congress. Since enlistment is now the primary,
and may soon be the sole, means of filling the ranks of the armed
forces,3 it is especially necessary that these consequences be recognized.
This comment concludes that an enlistee should be thought to have
any sort of contractual right only if he has been induced to enter the
armed services by the promise of special training or assignment. Outside this limited context, the application of contract principles to en1 Naval Personnel Instruction (NAVPERS) 15838A, Navy Recruiting Manual, art. B4203 (May 4, 1967, change no. 5, Oct. 1, 1970) [hereinafter cited as NAVPERS 15838A];
Marine Corps Order (MCO) P.1100.61C, Military Personnel Procurement Manual, para.
2351(l)(b) (June 2, 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCO P.1100.61C].
2 Enlistee refers to a person who has voluntarily enlisted in the armed forces, see
10 U.S.C. § 104(4) (1970), or a reserve component, see 10 U.S.C. § 261 (1970), as distinguished from an inductee, a person inducted through the Selective Service System, and
from a commissioned officer appointed by the President. Armed forces regulations require
that all enlistees sign Form 4, e.g., Army Reg. (AR) 601-210, Regular Army Enlistment
Program, para. 6-10 (May 1, 1968) [hereinafter cited as AR 601-210]; NAVPERS 15838A,

supra note 1; Air Training Command Manual (ATCM) 33-2, Recruiting Procedures for
the United States Air Force, para. 11-3 (July 1, 1972) [hereinafter cited as ATCM 33-2];
MCO P.1100.61C, supra note 1, para. 2351(a); Army Reg. (AR) 140-111, Army Reserve

Enlistment and Reenlistment, para. 5-8 (July 31, 1970, change no. 1, Apr. 9, 1971).
3 President Nixon has set July 1, 1973 as the date for transition to an all-volunteer
armed force. E.g., 1971 U.S. CoDna CONG. & AD. NEws 18; N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1972, at 1,
col. 8.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39:783

listment often results in injustice to enlistees and the contravention
of the policies of the government.
I.

Ti

APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL CONTRACT RULES
TO ENLISTMENT

Many courts during the nineteenth century characterized enlistment
as a contract, 4 perhaps because of the prevalent belief that contract is
the ultimate principle of order in a civilized society. 5 A few courts
maintained that enlistment was an ordinary contract governed by
the "well-established principles which regulate contracts generally."
Most courts, however, perceived difficulties in reconciling ordinary
contract rules to the exigencies of military policy and, while agreeing
that enlistment was in some sense contractual, refused to apply contract
7
principles to the problems before them.
The Supreme Court finally dealt with the subject in 1890.8 In In re
Grimley,9 an enlistee who had been imprisoned as a result of his conviction by court martial sought release on the ground that, since he was
4 E.g., United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946 (No. 14,497) (C.C.D. Mass 1816)
(Story, J.); Commonwealth v. Gamble, 11 S. & R. 93 (Pa. 1824); 6 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 187,
190 (1853).
5 This attitude is epitomized by Maine's aphorism that "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract," I-L MAINE,
ANCIENT LAW 170 (1st ed. 1861) (emphasis in original), and by Parsons's statement that
"out of contracts, express or implied, . . . grow all rights, all duties, all obligations, and
all law," 1 T. PARSONS, CoNrcrs 3 (1853); see Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HA.v.

L. REv. 553, 570 (1933); Pound, Law as Developed in Juristic Thought, 30 HARv. L. Rxv.
201, 218-20 (1917).
6 Op. AiT'Y G aN. 187, 190 (1853); see Commonwealth v. Cushing, 11 Mass. 67, 70
(1814), 15 Op. ATr'Y Ga. 152, 157-62 (1876).
7 The two positions met head-on in United States v. Blakeney, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 405, 409
(1847), when the court refused to apply to enlistment the contract principle that contracts
of minors are voidable:

The enlistment is usually spoken of as a contract, and without impropriety, inasmuch as that expresses the mutual consent of the parties; but it is a contract of a
[and] in its principles and consequences, is certainly widely difpeculiar nature ...
I do not, however,
ferent from the ordinary civil compacts between individuals ....
object to the name of contract as applied to a voluntary enlistment: the name is
unimportant, unless we suffer it to mislead us as to the true character of the thing.
The dissenters would have had the name control the legal consequences: "[V]oluntary enlistment must be regarded as a mere contract, the validity of which is to be determined
." Id. at 427. Blakeney and United
by principles applicable to all other contracts ..
States v. Cottingham, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 649 (1843), contain the most penetrating and
thorough discussions of enlistment in the nineteenth century cases. See also Tyler v.
Pomeroy, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 480, 485-86 (1864); Commonwealth v. Gamble, 11 S. & R. 92
(Pa. 1824).
8 At an earlier date the Court had referred to enlistment as a "contract ... for faithful service." United States v. Landers, 92 U.S. 77, 79 (1875). The present vitality of
Landers is unclear. Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393, 402 n.13 (1961).
9 137 US. 147 (1890).
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over the statutory age limit when he enlisted, his enlistment was void
and the court martial lacked jurisdiction over him. The Supreme
Court noted that the case involved "a matter of contractual relation
between the parties" and that "the law of contracts . . . is worthy
of notice"; since Grimley had misrepresented his age to the recruiter,
according to "the ordinary law of contracts" he could not, on the basis
of his own misrepresentation, avoid the contract.' 0 The Court did nof,
however, rest its decision on ordinary contract law. It stated that in
enlistment "something more is involved than the making of a contract
.... Enlistment is a contract; but it is one of those contracts which
changes ... status ....-11 Although the Court failed to explain how
its concept of a contract which changes status applied to the problem
before it,12 its decision seems to have been based on a construction of
the enlistment statute. According to the Court, Congress did not intend
the statute to prevent persons over the statutory age limit from serving
in the military, 3 and, therefore, the statute could not serve to render
the enlistments of such persons void.
The doctrine of Grimley-that enlistment is a contract which
changes status-has been the subject of conflicting interpretations. 14
10 Id. at 150-51.
31 Id. at 151.
12 The only consequence suggested by the Court was that where status is changed, "no
breach of the contract destroys the new status or relieves from the obligations which its
existence imposes." Id. at 151. However, no one had argued that Grimley's desertion constituted a breach capable of terminating a contractual relationship and releasing him
from service, exposing him "to an action for damages." Id. Grimley argued that his enlistment was never effected because he did not meet the statutory age requirement. It is
difficult to see how his failure to meet that requirement or his misrepresentation concerning his age could be characterized as a breach.
13 Id. at 153; cf. United States v. Blanton, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 664, 666, 23 C.M.R. 128, 130
(1957), which reached an opposite conclusion regarding the minimum statutory age of
seventeen.
14 This conflict has probably been caused by the awkward concept of "a contract which
changes status." Although contract and status are protean and elusive concepts, it is clear
that at the time of the Grimley decision, they were mutually exclusive. Endrey, Contract
and Status, 29 Ausr. LJ. 333 (1955). The classic contract concept denoted a legal relationship that was voluntarily assumed, that could be voluntarily terminated (by agreement
of the parties or by paying damages), and whose terms were determined by agreement.
Status referred to a relationship imposed by operation of law, terminated only by operation of law, and whose terms were determined by law. R. GRAvasON, STATUS IN TH
COMMON LAw 129-34 (1953). Justice Brewer probably intended to characterize enlistment
as what would today be called a status voluntarily assumed. The two examples he gave of
contracts that change status, marriage and naturalization, are referred to by modern
writers as "status," see, e.g., C. ALLEN, LEGAL DTrrIEs 39 (1931), as is voluntary enlistment,
G. TREIrEL, TaI LAw OF CoNTRAcT 5 (3d. ed. 1970). Perhaps Justice Brewer refrained
from characterizing enlistment simply as status because the contemporaneous conception
of status popularized by Maine did not include "conditions as are the immediate or
remote result of agreement." H. MAINE, supra note 5, at 170.
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One line of cases, exemplified by a series of recent decisions of the
Court of Military Appeals, has held that there is no contractual relationship whatever between an enlistee and the armed services; instead,
enlistment effects a status, the rights and duties of which are defined by
statutes and regulations and to which the laws of contract are inapplicable. 15 Federal district and appellate courts, however, continue
to cite Grimley for the proposition that "[i]t is settled that enlistment
in the military service establishes a contractual relationship."' 6 Some of
the Court's statements in Grimley seem to support this proposition, but
it is clear that Grimley's holding represents, at the very least, a rejection
of the use of contract principles to resolve problems concerning matters
governed by statute.
The difficulties involved in characterizing the relationship between
the armed services and enlistees as contractual are suggested by examining an ordinary enlistment.'7 The documents normally used t6
effect such an enlistment are virtually devoid of provisions that can be
considered contractual terms. The Form 4 enlistment contract 18 and
15 Taylor v. Resor. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 405, 406, 42 C.M.R. 7, 8 (1970); United States v.
Noyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 483, 490, 40 C.M.R. 195, 202 (1969); United States v. Blanton, 7
U.S.C.M.A. 664, 666, 23 C.M.R. 128, 120 (1957). This view is consistent with holdings that
a contractual relationship is not created by the appointment of military officers, Crenshaw
v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890), the appointment of civil officers, Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. 402 (1851), or the hiring of government employees, Urbina v. United
States, 428 F.2d 1280 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Indeed, some commentators have suggested that those
transactions should also be regarded as establishing a status. See Richardson, Incidents of
the Government-Servant Relationship, 54 MICH. L. REv. 633 (1956). For discussions of
status, see Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 121 F.2d 336, 343 (2d Cir. 1941) (Frank,
J.); R. GRAvEsON, STATUS IN THE COMMON LAW (1953); 4 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENc E 262-76
(1959).
16 Mellinger v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 434, 444 n.38 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See, e.g., Harmonson
v. United States, 2 S.S.L.R. 3151, 3152 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F. Supp.
554, 556 (D. Colo. 1968); cases cited notes 99, 104 &-124 infra.
17 For the purposes of this comment, ordinary enlistment refers to enlistment without
guarantees of special training or assignment. See note 122 inlra.
18 Dep't of Defense (DD) Form 4, Enlistment Contract-Armed Forces of the United
States (Feb. 1, 1970) [hereinafter cited as DD Form 4]. The first part of this two-page
standard government form consists of forty-nine spaces for recording personal data and
is designed for use in processing inductees as well as enlistees. MCO P.1100.61C, supra
note 1, para. 2351(1)(c); NAVPERS 15838A, supra note 1, art. B-22402(1). The remainder
of the document contains the oath of enlistment (items 57, 58), the witnessing officer's
confirmation of enlistment (item 59), two provisions that quote statutes applicable only
to the Navy (items 51, 52), a provision that paraphrases statutes applicable only to
reserve components (item 53), and the following provisions:
50. I know that if I secure my enlistment by means of any false statement, willful
misrepresentation or concealment as to my qualifications for enlistment, I am liable
to trial by court martial or discharge for fraudulent enlistment and that, if rejected
because of any disqualification known and concealed by me, I will not be furnished
return transportation to place of acceptance.
I am of legal age to enlist. I have never deserted from and I am not a member

1972]

Armed Forces Enlistment

the other documents used for an ordinary Army enlistment, 19 for

example, consist almost entirely of disclaimers20 and of spaces for
recording personal data concerning the enlistee. 21 The terms of any

supposed contract must, therefore, be found in the statutes and
military regulations governing enlisted members of the armed forces.

It is, perhaps, possible to characterize a relationship of this sortone that, although voluntarily entered into, is governed entirely by
statutes and regulations-as, in some sense, contractual. 22 The Court

in Grimley seems to have recognized, however, that there is some
danger in doing this, that simply because enlistment can be considered
a species of contract, it does not necessarily follow that disputes involv-

ing enlistment should be resolved according to the principles of the
general theory of contracts. 23 The rules of the general theory, as set
of the Armed Forces of the United States, the U.S. Coast Guard or any Reserve
component thereof; I have never been discharged from the Armed Forces or any type
of civilian employment in the United States or any other country on account of
disability or through sentence of either civilian or military court unless so indicated
by me in item 56, "Remarks" of this contract. I am not now drawing retired pay,
a pension, disability allowance, or disability compensation from the government of the
United States.
54. I have had this contract fully explained to me, I understand it, and certify
that no promise of any kind has been made to me concerning assignment to duty,
geographical area, schooling, special programs, assignment of government quarters,
or transportation of dependents except as indicated
55. I swear (or affirm) that the foregoing statements have been read to me, that
my statements have been correctly recorded and are true in all respects and that I
fully understand the conditions under which I am enlisting.
11) AR 601-210, supra note 2, para. 6-4 to 6-8, requires that in addition to Form 4,
male enlistees sign the following documents: Department of Defense (DD) Form 98,
Armed Forces Security Questionnaire; Department of Defense (DD) Form 398, Statement
of Personal History; Department of the Army (DA) Form 3286, Statements for Enlistment,
pts. II & I (all of which are records of personal data); and Department of the Army
(DA) Form 3286, pt. III (which consists entirely of disclaimers and provisions pertaining
only to special programs).
20 E.g., DD Form 4, supra note 18, item 54; Dep't of the Army (DA) Form 3286, Statements for Enlistment, pL I, item la: "All promises made to me are contained in items 3
..
37 . . . 48 . . . of the DD Form 4, my Enlistment Contract."
21 The armed forces' recourse against an enlistee who supplies false personal data is
not a contract action, but a court martial action for fraudulent enlistment. 10 U.S.C. § 883
(1970).
22 See, e.g., Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 33 CoLUM. L. REv.
397, 411 (1933), which points out that the word "contract" has been used "to embrace all
forms of legal obligation, or alteration of legal relations, grounded on manifestation of
consent." See also Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 103,
111 (1970).
23 One commentator has observed that "the conception of 'contract' is stretched to
micrometer thickness" when it is applied to so-called compulsory contracts, such as insurance contracts in which substantially all the terms are prescribed by law. Patterson,
Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM. L. Rev. 731, 743 (1943). That there
are limits to this stretching process, at least in terms of utility, is suggested by the efforts
of courts and commentators to remove such status-saturated contracts as insurance policies,
see Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract, 1954 INs. LJ. 151; Schultz, The Special

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39:783

forth in the Restatement 24 and the major treatises, 25 were developed

with reference to private law transactions, such as the sale of goods
between merchants, 28 that do not involve the considerations of public
27
policy affecting transactions between enlistees and the armed services.
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected contract principles as
an aid in resolving problems involving statutory requirements. In a
companion case to Grimley, In re Morrissey,28 the Court held that the
validity of the enlistment of a minor "depends wholly upon the legislature" 29 and is unaffected by common law contract principles.3 0
More recently, in Bell v. United States,31 the Court held that enlisted
men were entitled under the applicable statutes to recover their acNature of the Insurance Contract, 15 LAw & Cormrp. PRoB. 376 (1950), and collective
bargaining agreements, see Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HRV.L. Rlv. 999 (1955); Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78
YAr L.J. 525 (1969), from the general theory of contract and to treat them as separate
areas of law, see L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACr LAw IN AMERICA, 23, 24 (1965); Gilmore, supra
note 22, at 110; Summers, supra, at 567.
24 R ESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs (1932).
25 E.g., S. WiLrsroN, A TREATSE ON THE LAW or CoNTRAcrs (3d ed. 1957).
26 See Summers, supra note 23, at 566-67. Professor Summers argues: "If the 'law of
contracts' is to be conceived as encompassing all contractual transactions, it must not be
conceptualized as a single body of law but as a family of bodies of law, interrelated but
each distinctive." Id. at 567. The members of the family would include the law of insurance contracts, partnership agreements, collective agreements, and among others, the
"general theory of contract" presented in the treatises and the Restatement. The last
member, he suggests, "is not a parent body of law but rather just another portion of the
multifaceted law of contractual transactions." Id.
27 See McCullough & Joy v. Seamans, 5 S.S.L.R. 3647 (E.D. Cal. 1972); United States v.
Blakeney, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 405 (1847). For discussions of the difficulties of applying contract principles to governmental transactions, see Frenzen, The Administrative Contract
in the United States, 87 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 270 (1968); Mitchell, The Treatment of
Public Contractsin The United States, 9 U. TORONTO L.J. 194 (1952).
28 137 U.S. 157 (1890).
29 Id. at 159.
30 During the nineteenth century the contract rule that contracts of minors are, with
a few exceptions, voidable at their election caused considerable difficulty because the enlistment of minors was a military necessity. See United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas.
946 (No. 14,497) (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (Story, J.); Commonwealth v. Gamble, 11 S. & R.
93 (Pa. 1824). At least one court followed the rule to the conclusion that a minor who
enlisted in the armed forces and committed a military offense could avoid his contract
and thereby escape the jurisdiction of a court martial. Commonwealth v. Cushing, 11
Mass. 67 (1814).
Half a century after Morrissey the Court of Military Appeals, provoked by the persistence of counsel in arguing contract theory in cases involving the enlistment of minors,
reemphasized that: "[Although an] agreement to enlist in an armed service is often referred
to as a contract. . . . [w]hat is really created is a status. . . . As a result, no useful
purpose is served by reviewing the common-law rules of contract and whether the contract of a minor is, under the common law, voidable at his election. ... We must . . .
[instead] look to the statutes .... " United States v. Blanton, 7 U.S.C.MA. 664, 665-66,
23 C.M.R. 128, 129-30 (1957).
31 366 U.S. 393 (1961).
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crued pay and allowances even though they had "behaved with utter
disloyalty" while interned in a North Korean prison camp.8 2 It rejected
the government's argument that the soldiers could recover nothing
because their behavior constituted a material breach of their enlistment contracts. 3 Despite these decisions by the Supreme Court, however, federal district and appellate courts have continued to employ
contract rules to resolve problems concerning the statutes and regulations defining enlistees' rights and obligations, the constitutional
rights of enlistees, and the procedures by which enlistment may be
effected.
A. Statutes and Regulations
The case of Wallace v. Chafee illustrates the courts' use of contract principles to resolve essentially statutory questions. In Wallace,
a Marine Corps reservist on inactive duty training was convicted by a
summary court martial of having wilfully disobeyed the orders of a
superior commissioned officer. The reservist sought relief on the
ground that the court martial lacked jurisdiction over him. The
Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that court martial jurisdiction extends to members of reserve units on inactive duty training only
if they have voluntarily accepted written orders specifying that they
are subject to the Code.3 5 The district court 6 agreed with Wallace that
his acceptance of such orders had not been voluntary within the meaning of the statute. The court argued that the acceptance of court
martial jurisdiction is a waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
of civilian criminal justice and that, in order to be valid, it must be an
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."3 7 The
court found that the procedure by which Wallace accepted the orders
reduced any element of choice "to its minimum dimensions":38 the
orders had been presented to him in the midst of "a sea of forms,"
and he had been given no information concerning the Code or the
consequences of his acceptance. 89
32 Id.

at 594.

The Court, citing Grimley, emphasized that "common-law rules governing private
contracts have no place in the area of military pay. A soldier's entitlement to pay is
dependent upon statutory right." Id. at 401.
34 451 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1971).
85 UCMJ art. 2(3), 10 US.C. § 802(3) (1970).
86 323 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
37 Id. at 904. The court cited Johnson v. Zerbst, 804 U.S. 458, 464 (1988), which applied
33

the standard of intentional relinquishment of a known right to the waiver of assistance
of counsel in a criminal trial.
38 323 F. Supp. at 904.
39 Id.
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The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's opinion that
acceptance of court martial orders constitutes a waiver of fundamental
rights and that the wording of the statute seemed to indicate "that
Congress may have desired a truly voluntarily acceptance." 40 Nonetheless, the circuit court reversed. It concluded that since a reservist
accepts the orders "only as part of the contractual transaction of enlistment," it is sufficient if "the contract law standards of notice and volitional act are met."41 The court continued: "One who enters a
contract is on notice of the provisions of the contract. If he assents
voluntarily to those provisions after notice, he should be presumed, in
the absence of ambiguity, to have understood and agreed to comply
with the provisions as written. This is hornbook contract law."42
The Ninth Circuit thus argued that the orders by which reservists
are subjected to court marital jurisdiction constitute contracts and that,
since Wallace had signed the orders, he must, according to contract law,
be presumed to have understood them. It is difficult, however, to see
why acceptance of the orders should be considered the making of a
contract. The matter is governed by the statutory provision of the
Uniform Code requiring voluntary acceptance, and this provision
should, like all statutes, be construed to accord with constitutional
requirements, without reference to the principles of contract law.
Contract principles have also been used to dispose of due process
challenges to the procedures by which reservists are ordered to active
duty for unsatisfactory participation in their reserve units.43 In Ansted
v. Resor,44 the reservist claimed that his activation was unconstitutional
because he had not been accorded a hearing. The court responded that
the statutes and regulations did not require a hearing and that the
reservist had contractually agreed to be subject to the procedures that
they set forth. 45 In Mickey v. Barclay,46 the court held it unnecessary
40 451 F.2d at 1377. The court noted that article 2(3) is the only one of the twelve
jurisdictional provisions of article 2 that makes UCMJ jurisdiction dependent upon
voluntary submission.
41 Id.
42 Id.

43 10 U.S.C. § 673a (1970), authorizes the President to order to active duty for a period
of up to 24 months "any member of the Ready Reserve ... not assigned to, or participating satisfactorily in, a unit of the Ready Reserve." The President delegated that authority
to the Secretary of Defense, Exec. Order No. 11866, 10 U.S.C. § 673a (Supp. 1972); the
Secretary of Defense, in turn, delegated it to the secretaries of the armed forces, 82
C.F.R. §§ 100.3(a)(b), 101.3 (1972), who have promulgated regulations specifying activation
procedures, e.g., Army Reg. (AR) 135-91, Policies and Procedures Governing Satisfactory
Participation (June 11, 1968).
44 437 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1971).
45 Id. at 1024; cf. Konn v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. Wis. 1971). But see Mielke
v. Laird, 324 F. Supp. 165, 166 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
46 328 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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to determine whether activation procedures conformed to the requirements of due process because, the court stated, involuntary activation is
simply a "sanction imposed upon a reservist for breach of his enlist47

ment contract."
Involuntary activation procedures are, however, no more contractual
than the statutory provisions authorizing court martials. The documents that an enlistee signs when he enlists contain no provisions
describing the procedures for involuntary activation. Even if the
documents did contain such provisions, the real issue would remain
what safeguards, if any, are constitutionally required 48 in procedures
by which the government affects substantial individual interests and
deprives individuals of their liberty and constitutional rights. 49 Contract principles can be of no help in resolving this question since contractual provisions cannot alter constitutional requirements, and the
methods by which constitutional rights may be waived 0 must be determined by reference to the Constitution itself.
B.

Procedures for Effecting Enlistment.

The courts have frequently applied contract principles to resolve
disputes concerning the procedures necessary to effect enlistment.8 1
47 Id. at 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1971); cf. Mellinger v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa.
1972). The courts seem to have assumed that involuntary activation is a remedy agreed
upon by parties to a contract. See generally Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed
Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495 (1962).
48 Statutes and regulations that prescribe court martial procedure and other military
administrative action are subject to challenge in the federal courts on due process grounds.
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142, 152-55 (1953); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the
Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 188 (1962). Contra, Comment, Constitutional Rights of
Servicemen Before Courts-Martial,64 COLUm. L. Rxv. 127, 146 (1964).

49 The courts have generally acknowledged that the individual interests affected by
activation are substantial. E.g., O'Mara v. Zebrowski, 447 F.2d 1085, 1089 (3d Cir. 1971).
In Ansted and Mickey, petitioners were separated from their homes and employment for
seventeen and sixteen months respectively, and were subjected to a significant loss of
liberty and forfeiture of constitutional rights for those periods. See notes 95-96 infra.
50 In Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 941

(1970), the court implied that the "contract agreement" could "waive . . . procedural

rights which might have otherwise existed without it."
51 An analogous problem, involving the procedures necessary to terminate an enlistment, was created by an opinion of the Attorney General which held that since an enlistment was a "contract ...

for a specific tern of service ...

," it automatically ended

when the term of enlistment expired, thus implying that an enlistee who simply departed from his post at that time could not be prosecuted for absence without leave or

desertion. 15 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 152, 161 (1876) (emphasis in original). However, in United
States v. Downs, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 90, 11 C.M.R. 90 (1953), the Court of Military Appeals
expressly refused to apply the contract concept to this situation and held that "[b]ecause
of the compelling necessity for an orderly separation procedure," an enlistment does not
terminate until the enlistee is formally "discharged through one of the 'recognized legal
modes of separation from the service'." Id. at 92, 11 C.M.R. at 92. See also United States
v. Scott, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 29 C.M.R. 462 (1960).
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Among the consequences of this application of contract rules is the
doctrine of constructive enlistment. For example, in a 1918 opinion
the Army Judge Advocate General argued that "since an enlistment
is the act of making a contract to voluntarily serve the Government as a
soldier," it follows "logically that an enlistment contract can be implied
as well as expressed"; therefore, the Judge Advocate concluded, an
enlistment can be effected by the receipt of military pay or other
benefits.5 2 The Judge Advocate's opinion, and the doctrine of constructive enlistment that it expressed, is clearly contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in Grimley that enlistment must be effected by formal
oath.5 3 The requirement of a formal oath " may serve a cautionary
function, 5 deterring ill-considered or accidental enlistments-a function of particular importance in view of the serious consequences that
enlistment may have, including loss of liberty and forfeiture of certain
constitutional rights. Despite these considerations, the doctrine of constructive enlistment has persisted.58
The rules of contract have also been employed in cases concerning
misconduct or misrepresentation by military recruiters. In Ex parte
Blackington,57 for example, the court found that the recruiter had been
52 1918 Op. JAG 488 (1918). A civilian present at the National Guard Armory when
the regiment was mobilized was "ordered to fall in." He obeyed the order, trained and
served with the regiment for a year, and then applied for a discharge on the ground
that he was not legally in the service because he had neither enlisted nor been inducted.
The discharge was denied on the ground that the civilian had effected an implied enlistment by receiving pay and by rendering military service.
53 137 U.S. 147, 156 (1890). One issue in Grimley was "whether petitioner had, in fact,
enlisted." Id. at 155. Immediately after he took the oath of enlistment from the recruiter,
petitioner departed; he was arrested three months later as a deserter. The Court noted
that article 47 of the Articles of War subjected to court martial jurisdiction "[a]ny . . .
soldier who, having received pay, or having been duly enlisted . . . deserts . . .." Id.
at 156. Since Grimley had not received pay, it was necessary for the Court to determine
what constituted an enlistment. Although the Court recognized that Grimley could have
been court martialed if he had received pay, it did not suggest that the receipt of pay
could constitute an enlistment. Since the receipt-of-pay clause was later eliminated from
the desertion article, Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, art. 58, 39 Stat. 660, there is
presently no basis whatever for the notion that the receipt of pay subjects a person to
court martial jurisdiction.
54 10 U.S.C. § 502 (1970), requires that every enlistee take an oath but is silent as to
whether taking the oath is sufficient or necessary to effect an enlistment. 10 U.S.C. § 1031
(1970), however, implies that the oath is "required" to effect an enlistment.
55 See the discussion of "The Functions Performed by Legal Formalities" in Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 CoLtrm. L. REv. 799, 800 (1941).
56 See United States ex rel. Norris v. Norman, 296 F. Supp. 1270, 1275-76 (N.D. Ill.
1969); United States v. King, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 28 C.M.R. 243 (1959); United States v.
Overton, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 684, 689, 26 C.M.R 464, 469 (1958) (Latimer, J., dissenting). See
also Note, Serviceman's Implied Consent to Military Status After Enlistment Term Expired Held Sufficient for Continuing Military Jurisdiction, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 384, 389
(1971).
57 245 F. 801 (D. Mass. 1917).
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"actuated by bias and hostility"; 58 he had enlisted the petitioner in
the heavy artillery even though he had discovered that the petitioner
suffered from a physical infirmity which would render duty near
cannons hazardous. The court, nonetheless, dismissed the petition for
habeas corpus. It held that, although the recruiter might be accountable to his superiors for enlisting a person unfit for service, he had
no obligation to the petitioner to determine fairly his fitness for
artillery duty. The court explained that enlistment "rests on a contract
between the recruit and the government" based on the recruit's
offer of service and its acceptance by military authorities. In making
this contract, the court stated, "the parties deal at arm's length; neither
occupies a fiduciary position towards the other; each looks out for his
(or its) own interest." 59
In several recent cases in which enlistees have sought discharge on
the ground that their enlistments were induced by misrepresentation,
the courts' tendency to frame enlistment in contract terms has had
two important consequences. First, courts have held applicable to such
cases the principle of government contract law that agents of the
United States cannot bind it contractually except within the scope of
their actual authority. And second, they have assumed that the disclaimers in Department of Defense Form 4 are contractual provisions
and must be construed according to orthodox contract principles.
In Gausmann v. Clifford,60 for example, an enlistee alleged that the
recruiter had induced him to enlist by representing that upon enlistment in the Army's Europe Option0 ' he would be assigned to Europe
for four years. The enlistee claimed that the Army had breached its
contract by reassigning him to Viet Nam after only one year in Europe.
The district court ignored the question whether the recruiter had made
the alleged representations. 2 Instead, it scrutinized the enlistment
58 Id. at 802.
59 Id. at 803. The continuing vitality of this arm's length bargaining principle was
evident in Wallace v. Chafee, 451 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1971), in which the court assumed
that since the court martial orders were presented to the reservist at the time he enlisted,
the standard of voluntariness applicable to his acceptance of the orders was the same
arm's length bargaining contract standard applicable to the rest of the enlistment
procedure.
60 Civil No. 49769 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 10, 1969), aff'd. sub nom., Gausmann v. Laird, 422
F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969).
61 The particular cases discussed in this section involve enlistees in the specialized

enlistment programs discussed at note 122 infra, but the present discussion is applicable
to all types of enlistment.
62 Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed per curiam on the basis of the district court's
determination "that no such guarantee as petitioner now claims was given," Gausmann
v. Laird, 422 F.2d 394, 395, the district court found only that the Army had made no
such guarantee, not that the recruiter had made no verbal guarantee, Gausmann v. Clifford,
Civil No. 49769 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 10, 1969); see note 63 infra.
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documents and concluded that, since they contained no such guarantees,
no relief was available.63 Because the petitioner in Gausmann framed
the issue in terms of contractual breach, he could not prevail without
a showing that the recruiter's representations were contractual terms, a
result precluded by three orthodox contract principles: (1) such representations are not binding on the Army because the recruiter lacked
authority to make them; 64 (2) provisions in the documents that disclaim verbal promises65 must be enforced like other contractual provisions; 6 6 and (3) such oral representations are inadmissible parol
evidence.

67

Since he did not seek to enforce his enlistment contract by specific
performance or damages, but merely sought discharge from the Army,
the enlistee in Gausmann could simply have sought annulment of his
enlistment on the ground that it had been induced by misrepresentation. This theory of the case could have been advanced whether or not
enlistment is viewed as a contract 8 and would have rendered the actual
authority and parol evidence rules irrelevant. This approach was
taken by the enlistee in Shelton v. Brunson.6 9 In that case, the enlistee
alleged that he had been induced to reenlist by representations that he
63 The court concluded: "None of the documents which constitute the enlistment
contract indicate that the United States Army promised petitioner a tour of duty in
Europe... for the entire term of his four year enlistment." Gausmann v. Clifford, Civil
No. 49769, at 3 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 10, 1969).
64 For the principle that agents of the United States cannot bind it contractually except within the scope of their actual authority, see, e.g., Condec Corp. v. United States,
369 F.2d 753 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Newman v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 953 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
65 Petitioner had signed a statement of understanding which provided: "In connection
with my enlistment in the Regular Army this date, I hereby acknowledge that I completely understand the following: That all promises made to me are contained in items
Gausmann v. Clifford, Civil
11, 13 or 37 of the DD Form 4, my enlistment record .
No. 49769, at 2 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 10, 1969).
66 See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1955)
(Harlan, J.) But see id. at 204 (Frank, J., dissenting). Compare David v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 59 Misc. 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup. Ct. 1969) with David v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1080, 287 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
67 See 3 A. CoamnN, CoNmTACrs § 573 (1960). But see Childres & Spitz, Status in the Law
of Contract 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 6 (1972).
68 If enlistment is viewed as a contract, an action can be brought to avoid it. Shelton v.
Brunson, No. 7g-1042, at 7-8 (5th Cir., Aug. 17, 1972); Bemis v. Whalen, 341 F. Supp.
1289, 1291 (S.D. Cal. 1972). See also United States ex rel. Norris v. Norman, 296 F. Supp.
1270 (N.D. Ill. 1969), which voided an enlistment on the ground of duress. But see Ex
parte Blackington, 245 F. 801, 803 (D. Mass. 1917), which indicates that ordinary contract
principles may be insufficient to deal with the problem of nondisclosure. Compare Keeton,
Fraud-Concealmentand Non-Disclosure, 15 TAcs L. REv. 1 (1936) with Kessler & Fine,
Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargainingin Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract:A Comparative Study, 77 HAav. L. REv. 401 (1964).
69 335 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd in part, vacated in part, No. 72-1042 (5th
Cir., Aug. 17, 1972).
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met the physical requirements for an officer training program. Midway
through the program, however, he was dismissed from it because he
did not, in fact, meet those requirements, and he was reassigned to
Iceland. The enlistee sought discharge on the ground that his enlistment had been induced by fraudulent misrepresentations. 70 The district court denied relief,71 and the Fifth Circuit, in turn, denied a stay
of the order transferring the enlistee to Iceland.72 The district court
relied on both the actual authority doctrine and on the disclaimer
contained in item 54 of Form 4, which states that "no promise of any
kind has been made to me concerning assignment to duty, geographical
area, schooling, [or] special programs . . ,,7 The court, applying
ordinary contract principles, considered this provision conclusive
evidence that the enlistee had not relied on any oral representations.
As Judge Wisdom argued in his forceful dissent to the Fifth Circuit's
decision denying a stay, the district court's reliance on these contract
doctrines was misplaced. First, the fact "that the recruiters lacked
actual authority to bind the Air Force [was] irrelevant." Since the enlistee was seeking to avoid the enlistment on the ground of misrepresentation, "[t]he question [was] ... one of apparentauthority: whether
it was reasonable for Shelton to conclude that the recruiters had the
authority to bind the Air Force which their very function, and apparently their own words, suggested they would have." 74
Second, Judge Wisdom argued that if contract principles were to be
applied, they should be those applicable to contracts of adhesion. 5 In
enlistment, as in transactions that have been characterized as adhesion
contracts7 standardized forms prepared by one party are presented to
the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and one of the parties is in exclusive control of important information concerning the subject matter
70 See Wong v. Laird, 4 S.S.L.R. 3650 (N.D. Cal. 1971), which granted such relief. The
court found that the petitioner had been induced to enlist in the Army by a recruiter's
representation that he would be assigned to duty as a stenographer. The court ordered

that if petitioner was not assigned duty as a stenographer within twelve days, a writ of
habeas corpus would be granted requiring that he be discharged.
71 Shelton v. Brunson, 335 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
72 Shelton v. Brunson, 454 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1972). An application for stay was denied

by Justice Powell, No. A-880 (U.S., Feb. 28, 1972), was temporarily granted by Justice
Douglas for the reasons stated in Judge Wisdom's dissent, No. A-880 (U.S., Mar. 4,
1972), and was denied by the Supreme Court, 405 U.S. 983 (1972).
73 454 F.2d at 737-38.
74 Id. at 737 (emphasis in original).
75 Id.
78 Some

commentators have pointed out that such transactions should not necessarily
be regarded as the formation of a contract. Bolgar, The Contract of Adhesion, 20 AM. J.
ComP. L. 53, 55-56 (1972); Endrey, supra note 14, at 335.
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of the transacion.7 7 This inequality of information is largely the result
of enlistment procedures that fail to provide the enlistee with objective
and complete information about the armed forces. The recruiter, a
trained salesman for military programs7 8 under pressure to fill enlistment quotas, 79 cannot be considered a source of such information; nor
do the enlistment documents fill the gap. The documents, which contain a considerable amount of military jargon and fine print with crossreferences to other military documents and no emphasis on the disclaimers, virtually compel the enlistee to rely on the recruiter for assistance in intepreting them. Moreover, Form 4 is only one of many
documents presented to the enlistee when he enlists.8 0
Judge Wisdom argued that the disclaimer in item 54 was ambiguous
in its application to the alleged representations and that under adhesion contract principles it should be construed as inapplicable to
77 Another characteristic of many transactions referred to as adhesion contracts is a
gross inequality of bargaining power between the parties. The essential characteristic of
the adhesion contract, however, is that one party's acceptance of the terms is involuntary,
either because of an inequality of bargaining power or information. See, e.g., Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), which discusses both the
superior bargaining position of automobile manufacturers, id. at 389-91, 161 A.2d at 86-87, and the inequality of information caused by the obscurity of the particular disclaimer
in that case, id. at 365-67, 161 A.2d at 73-74. See also M. BENFIELD, Nmv.APPROACHIES IN
THE LAw OF CoNrRAcrs 75 (1970). For a discussion of the principles of construction
applied to the insurance contract, an adhesion contract characterized by gross inequality
of information between the parties, see Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294,
305-07, 208 A.2d 638, 644-45 (1965).
78 See Scepansky, The Techniques of Modern Recruiting, 19 AIR U. REv. 73, 76-77
(1968). The author, a brigadier general in the Headquarters of the Air Force Recruiting
Service, states: "All would-be recruiters are introduced to the techniques of recruiting
and interviewing in an eight-week Recruiter Training Course at Lackland AFB, Texas.
. . . The students learn enough fundamental psychology so they can probe into a prospect's basic interests, desires, and ambitions. Once these are established, the recruiter
learns to concentrate on those aspects of an Air Force career which would most appeal
to the prospect-education, job satisfaction, security, etc. He discovers how to establish
empathy with the prospect and overcome objections, and he acquires an intuitive sense
of when to close the sale." Serious charges concerning hard-sell tactics of over-zealous
recruiters are made in P. BANFs, PAWNS, Tim PLiG-T OF THE CmiZEN-SomER 33-58
(1972), and in Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on the Draft of the House Comm.
on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12,656 (1970).
79 Each recruiting district and each recruiter receives a periodic enlistment quota which
is expected to be filled. THE REPORT OF THE PRESmENT'S COMMfIssION ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER
ARMED FOaCE 65 (1970); Scepansky, supra note 78, at 84.
80 See, e.g., NAVPERS 15838A, supra note 1, art. B-1501. Other documents which all
enlistees in the Navy must complete or sign include: Department of Defense (DD) Form 98,
Armed Forces Security Questionnaire (four pages); Department of Defense (DD) Form 398,
Statement of Personal History (four pages); Naval Personnel (NAVPERS) Form 1130/2,
Fraudulent Enlistment Warning (two pages); General Services Administration Standard
(SF) Form 93, Report of Medical History (two pages); Naval Personnel Form (NAVPERS)
1130/18, Affirmation of Truthfulness (one page).
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them."' Although the Fifth Circuit had refused to grant a stay of Shelton's transfer order, it recently vacated the district court's decision in
Shelton and remanded the case for further proceedings.8 2 The court
relied on a subjective theory of contract closely akin to adhesion principles. 3 It agreed with Judge Wisdom that the disclaimer was ambiguous in its application to Shelton's medical qualifications for a commission and held that the disclaimer would not be effective unless both
Shelton and the Air Force intended it to cover this question. The court
held that if either Shelton or the Air Force did not so intend and if
Shelton could establish that the alleged misrepresentations had been
made, then Shelton was, as a matter of law, entitled to avoid the enlistment contract.
Even in the absence of ambiguity, however, the enforceability of the
disclaimer is open to question. The courts have often refused to give
effect to such clauses in adhesion documents when they are not conspicuous and prominently placed. 4 Although item 54 is not in smaller
print than the rest of the document-unlike the famous disclaimer in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.SS--it is at the bottom of a
dozen sentences of fine print and is unemphasized. Moreover, the
prominence of item 54 must be judged in the context of the entire enlistment procedure.8 6 Under this approach, the disclaimer may be
used as some evidence that the enlistee did not rely on the alleged
misrepresentations, even though it cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of nonreliance. This approach may, therefore, be more realistic
than those suggested in Judge Wisdom's dissent and in the Fifth Cir81 454 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1972).
82 No. 72-1042 (5th Cir., Aug. 17, 1972).
83 A purely objective approach "is blind to details of subject matter and person," L.
FRmDMAN, supra note 23, at 20; if the individual has signed the document he is bound
by its contents, REsrATEMENT oF CONTRACrs § 70 (1932). A purely subjective approach is

concerned with the actual intent of the parties, whereas an adhesion approach is concerned with the reasonable intent of some category of persons in some category of circumstances. See generally Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HAnv. L. Rav. 529, 539-44 (1971).
84 See, e.g., Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 298, 225 A.2d 328, 331-32
(1966); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 395-405, 161 A.2d 69, 90-94
(1960).
85 32 N.J. 358, 866, 161 A.2d 69, 73 (1960).
86 See Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 46 (1951), in which the Court held that the
effect to be given a footnote in a standard government form was to be determined by
reference to the "total setting" in which the document was signed. Id. It is interesting to
speculate whether the Court would have reached the same result in Moser if it had viewed
the document as a contract; and it is, perhaps, useful to inquire whether there is any
more reason to regard Form 4 as a contract than the form which petitioner in Moser
signed.
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cuit's opinion. 7 Under Judge Wisdom's approach, the ambiguous disclaimer is construed to be inapplicable to the misrepresentations;
under the Fifth Circuit's, the disclaimer is inapplicable if the enlistee
did not intend it to apply. Thus, under neither approach could the
disclaimer be taken as evidence-however inconclusive-of nonreliance.

Another perspective on the misrepresentation problem can be obtained by abandoning the contract concept entirely and by viewing
enlistment, not as the making of a contract, but simply as an administrative procedure by which persons enter the armed forces. s8 Viewed
in this way, analogies can be drawn from cases involving induction,
the alternative method of entering the armed services. The courts have
held that an inductee must be discharged from the armed services if his
induction was precipitated by a prejudicial violation of Selective Service regulations.8 9 Since the armed services, as well as the Selective
Service System, are required to follow their own regulations, 0 and
since some of the services have issued regulations that prohibit recruiters from making misrepresentations to enlistees, 91 enlistees should be
afforded similar relief. Moreover, recent decisions have held that even
in the absence of such regulations, the Selective Service System has an
87 For criticism of these indirect approaches, see Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd.,
221 F.2d 189, 204-06 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting); Kessler, Contracts of AdhesionSome Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUm. L. Riv. 629, 635 (1943).
88 Under this approach, as under the direct contract of adhesion approach, see text at
note 84 supra, disclaimers such as item 54 are merely some evidence that the enlistee
did not rely on the alleged misrepresentations.
89 E.g., Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 235, 246-48 (1968); Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970); Striker v. Resor, 283 F. Supp. 923, 926
(D.N.J. 1968). For an extensive discussion of the element of prejudice, see United States
v. Rodwell, 338 F. Supp. 780 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Compare United States v. Woloszczuk, 458
F.2d 1255, 1258 (1st Cir. 1972), which emphasizes that "once a reasonable possibility of
prejudice exists, the burden rests on the government to prove that in fact no actual
prejudice resulted."
90 See, e.g., Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969); Joy v. Resor, 342 F. Supp. 70
(D. Vt. 1972). The principle that administrative action in violation of regulations can
constitute a denial of due process has been limited to military regulations developed for
the "protection" or "benefit" of servicemen, as opposed to regulations designed simply
to promote the efficient functioning of the military establishment. Silverthorne v. Laird,
460 F.2d 1175, 1186 (5th Cir. 1972); Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245, 251 (2d Cir. 1971).
But see Clark v. Brown, 414 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
91 E.g., ATCM 33-2, supra note 2, para. 1-6 (emphasis in original): "Recruiting personnel will not make promises to applicants, except as authorized by this or other Air
A single instance of misrepresentation, deception or other omission
Force Directives ....
of vital facts when information is given the applicant by recruiting personnel will not
be condoned." See also NAVPERS 15838A, supra note I, art., 8-1114; AR 601-210, supra
note 2. It is difficult to understand the purpose of such regulations if they are not for
the protection of enlistees. See note 90 supra.
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affirmative duty to give clear and correct information and advice when
requested to do so; 92 and that an inductee prejudiced by erroneous in-

formation given him by Selective Service personnel must be discharged. 3 This principle has been applied even when the Selective
Service employee had neither authority to dispense information nor an
intention to mislead the inductee. 94 The inquiry is simply whether the
inductee relied to his detriment on the erroneous representation. Since
both enlistment and induction result in an identical loss of liberty95
and forfeiture of constitutional rights,9 6 and both inductee and enlistee
require information in order to make important decisions, 97 the stan92 E.g., United States v. Cordova, 454 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Fisher,
442 F.2d 109, 114 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Burns, 431 F.2d 1070 (10th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Bryan, 263 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Ga. 1967). Contra, United States v. Brooks,
298 F. Supp. 254, 259 (W.D. La. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 422 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 911 (1970).
93 Powers v. Powers, 400 F2d 438 (5th Cir. 1968).
94 See, e.g., United States v. Bums, 431 F.2d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 1970).
95 Retention in the armed forces has been held to constitute a sufficient deprivation
of liberty to warrant extension of the habeas corpus remedy, which was originally
restricted to persons in actual physical confinement, to members of the armed forces,
and to members of reserve components. E.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238
(1962); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 710 (2d Cir. 1968); see Hansen, The Jurisdictional Bases of Federal Court Review of Denials of Administrative Discharges from the
Military 1, 3 S.S.L.R. 4001, 4002-03 (1971); Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARV. L. Rav. 1038, 1252-59 (1970).
96 The enlistee forfeits certain constitutional rights of civilian criminal procedure. He
becomes subject to trial by a court martial, which is an administrative tribunal established under article I, section 8 of the Constitution, independent of the article III judicial
power, United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14-17 (1955), without grand
jury indictment (by express provision of the fifth amendment), and without a jury, Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942). For an extensive discussion of the differences between
civilian and military trials, see O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969). Although
Justice Black's observation in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957), that "it has not been
dearly settled to what extent the Bill of Rights and other protective parts of the Constitution apply to military trials," is still sound, it should be noted that the Court of
Military Appeals has extended to courts martial many civilian procedures. For a recent
summary, see Remcho, Military Juries: ConstitutionalAnalysis and the Need for Reform,
47 IND. L.J. 193, 209-10 (1972). But see Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 52 n.4 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
The enlistee also suffers a curtailment of first amendment rights. T. EMERSON, THE SysTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSON 57 (1970). See also Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245, 252 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); Noland v. Irby, 341 F. Supp. 818, 820-21
(W.D. Ky. 1971). Although ordinary government employees are also subject to restraints
on their freedom of expression, United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947),
the restraints imposed on the enlistees are unique because they are irrevocable.
97 The enlistee must decide whether to take the oath of enlistment (which is necessary
to effect an enlistment, see note 53 supra). The inductee must decide whether to apply
for certain deferments and to make certain appeals, see, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 442
F.2d 109 (7th Cir. 1971), and whether to take the step forward in the induction ceremony,
which is necessary to effect induction, Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 559 (1943);
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dard applied in Selective Service cases should also be applied in cases
98
concerning enlistment.
II.

ENLISTMENT AS A SOURCE OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS

Because of their tendency to view enlistment as a contract, the courts
have assumed that enlistees have certain contractual rights, of which
they cannot be deprived without due process of law. Although most
of the courts have grounded such rights on specific written provisions
in enlistment documents, a few courts have held that, even in the
absence of such provisions, statutes governing enlistees are a source
of contractual rights and that the power of Congress to alter such
rights by statutory amendment is restricted by the fifth amendmentY9
However, if the term "contract" is to have any meaning at all, an
enlistee's contractual lights must be based on specific representations
Army Reg. (AR) 601-270, Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations, para. 3-22,
(Mar. 18, 1969, change no. 3, Apr. 19, 1971).
98 Analogies can also be drawn from standards of nonmisrepresentation and disclosure
required in other governmental procedures which impose a loss of liberty and forfeiture
of constitutional rights, such as criminal trial. See notes 95-96 infra. But see Wallace v.
Chafee, 451 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1971), discussed at notes 40-50 supra, in which the
court distinguished enlistment from criminal trial on the ground that, whereas the
criminal defendant has the court procedure "thrust upon him," the enlistee's entry into
the armed forces is "purely volitional." Although that distinction could also be drawn
between enlistment and induction, it is formalistic because both procedures have identical
consequences. A distinction that could be drawn between enlistment and criminal trial
is simply that the latter results in a more complete deprivation of liberty and constitutional rights, and, for that reason, more stringent safeguards may be necessary to
ensure that the criminal defendant is informed of his rights.
99 For example, in Morse v. Boswell, 289 F. Supp. 812 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd per curiam
401 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1052 (1968), 113 members of an Army
reserve unit activated by the President during the Pueblo incident sought an injunction
preventing the activation on the ground that it was in violation of their enlistment contracts. At the time the reservists enlisted, a statute provided that reserve units could be
activated by the President only "in time of national emergency declared by the President."
Subsequently Congress amended the statute to provide that reserve units could also be
activated by the President "when he deems it necessary." The reservists contended that
presidential activation pursuant to the amendment without a declaration of national
emergency constituted a contractual breach. The documents that the reservists signed
at the time of their enlistments contained no provision specifying the circumstances under
which reserve units could be activated by the President, but the district court assumed
that enlistment established a contractual relation and held that "the provisions of statutory law existing when each petitioner . . . [enlisted] became part and parcel of the
enlistment contract." 289 F. Supp. at 814. It was then compelled to impose a questionable
construction on the newly discovered contractual provisions in order to prevent their
violation by the statutory amendment. Accord, Goldstein v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 275
(D.N.J. 1968); Sullivan v. Cushman, 290 F. Supp. 659 (D. Mass. 1968). See also Allman,
Congress, the Courts, and the Unready Reservist, 23 JAG J. 113 (1969). For criticism of
these courts' construction of the phrase "when otherwise authorized by law," see Morse
v. Boswvell, 393 U.S. 802, 808 (1968) (denial of application for stay) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Morse v. Boswell, 393 U.S. 1052 (1968) (denial of certiorari) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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made to him at the time of his enlistment10° As Justice Douglas
pointed out in his dissent in Morse v. Boswell, the mere existence of a
statute is no more a source of contractual rights for an enlistee than
it is for any other citizen: "[I]t is within the power of Congress to
change existing law and no type of estoppel interferes with its lawmaking power.... The disappointment realized by those who relied
only on general law but did not have that explicit promise from their
government in contract form is disappointment of a kind shared by
all citizens in a society of shifting law."' 01
Even when it is claimed that specific provisions in enlistment documents are sources of contractual rights it is necessary to examine the
particular provisions and the reasons for regarding them as contractual.
At the outset, it is useful to distinguish between two types of provisions: first, those that paraphrase statutes, such as certain provisions
in the reserve component statements of understanding; 10 2 and second,
100 Whether contractual obligation is viewed as based upon agreement, G. TRannrL,
TE LAw OF Cotm'cr 1 (1970); UNInoFR COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (1972 version), or
upon promise, 1 A. CORBIN, CONRAcrs § 3 (1963), REsrATEmENT OF CocrRAcrs § 1 (1932),
it is based either upon the parties' actual intent and expectations concerning future
events (the subjective or meeting-of-the-minds approach, see, e.g., T. PARSONS, supra note
5), or upon a reasonable interpretation of the external manifestations of their intent and
expectations, that is, of their acts and words (the objective approach, see, e.g., 0. HOLMES,
TlE COaMON LAw 309 (1881); 1 S. WiusrON, supra note 25, § 95). Since enlistment is a
transaction between the enlistee and agents of the armed forces, an enlistee's contractual
rights must be based upon those agents' written or verbal representations.
The mere existence of a statute is not a source of contractual rights because statutory
provisions do not, in and of themselves, constitute promises concerning the legislature's
future actions. See Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 387 (1903). A
statute can be considered a source of contractual rights only if it is expressly or implicitly
adopted by the parties as a contractual term. Williston attacked the judicial practice of
treating a statute as an implied contractual term merely because it was in existence at
the inception of the contract: "Doubtless, law frequently is adopted by the parties as a
portion of their agreement. Whether it is or not in any particular case should be determined by the same standard of interpretation as is applied to their expressions in other
respects." 4 S. WmLLrON, supra note 25, § 615, at 614. The results of that practice can
sometimes be justified on policy grounds, see Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071, 1072-73, 1081 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1970), but they cannot be justified by the policies supporting the enforcement of contracts, see text at notes 130-31. The analysis in such cases
could be clarified by separating the contractual and the statutory elements of complex
legal relationships.
101 Morse v. Boswell, 393 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (denial of application for stay); see text
at note 105 infra; cf. Linsalata v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), which involved
the same fact situation as Morse except that the documents signed by the reservist contained an express provision paraphrasing the old statute.
102 E.g., Navy-Marine Corps (NAVMC) Form 10480, Statement of Understanding upon
Enlistment in the Marine Corps Reserve Six-Month Training Program (Apr., 1967);
Naval Personnel (NAVPERS) Form 1130/3, Statement of Understanding, Six Year Enlistment Program, USNR (4-10 Months Active) (June, 1966).
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those found in documents used for special enlistment programs, 10 3
which concern matters governed by military regulation and constitute
promises made to induce enlistment.
Reserve Component Statements of Understanding
Most courts have considered the statement of understanding a
source of contractual rights.104 This conclusion appears to be based on
a general assumption that all documents the enlistee signs are necessarily contracts rather than on any appraisal of the intent and effects
of the provisions. For example in Pfile v. Corcoran,10 5 an enlistee in
the Army Reserve signed, in addition to Form 4, a statement of understanding which provided: "If in any year I fail to perform satisfactorily
any of the requirements set forth above, I can be ordered to perform
active duty for training for a maximum of 45 days or be reported to selective service for immediate induction."' 1 6 This provision paraphrased
statutes in effect when the document was signed, which Congress later
07
amended to increase the maximum period of activation to two years.
When the enlistee was subsequently activated for seventeen months, he
sought release from active duty on the ground that the activation violated the terms of his enlistment contract. The district court held that
the document was a contract and that it had been breached by the activation; nonetheless, it concluded8 that the breach was justified as an
10
exercise of Congress's war power.
Because the court assumed that enlistment necessarily creates a
contractual relationship 0 9 and, therefore, began its analysis by searching for the contract's terms," 0 it rejected the Army's contention that
the statement of understanding "does not purport to be any sort of
contract or commitment, and has no legal effect other than to indicate
that the enlistee is aware of the applicable law at the time of enlistment.""'
A.

103 See documents cited note 123 infra.
104 Mellinger v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 434, 444-46 (E.D. Pa. 1972), and cases cited therein.
105 287 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1968), noted in 18 Am. U.L. Rav. 596 (1969).
106 287 F. Supp. at 557.
107 Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-687, 80 Stat. 981, codified in 10 U.S.C. § 673a
(1970).
108 287 F. Supp. at 560-61. Contra, Harmonson v. United States, 2 S.S.L.R. 3151 (C.D.
Cal. 1969); Gion v. McNamara, Civil Action No. 67-1963-S (Jan. 8, 1968, C.D. Cal.) (opinion set out in Schultz v. Clifford, 303 F. Supp. 965, 969 (D. Minn. 1968)).
109 The court based this assumption on a misreading of In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147
(1890), which it cited for the proposition that "[e]nlistment in the military service of the
United States is a voluntary act establishing a contractual relationship." 287 F. Supp. at
556. See text and notes at notes 8-16 supra.
110 287 F. Supp. at 557.
mnrd.
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There are at least two reasons why the Army's contention should
have been accepted. First, it is doubtful that Congress has authorized
the armed services to enter into contracts regarding subjects governed
by statute. The Supreme Court has suggested that in determing
whether a statute is the source of contractual rights, "it is of first
importance to examine the language of the statute" to see whether it
"provides for the execution of a written contract on behalf of the
state .... 1112 It is difficult, however, to find language in the statutory
provisions governing enlistees that can be construed in this way.113
Indeed, it is questionable that Congress has authorized the armed
services to enter into contracts with enlistees regarding any subject.11 4
Even if such authorization can be implied from statutory provisions
delegating broad powers to the secretaries of the armed forces 1 5 and
authorizing them to conduct intensive recruiting campaigns," 8 it is
doubtful that Congress intended to restrict its freedom to amend
statutes by authorizing the services to make binding commitments
to enlistees concerning statutory subjects." 7 Second, contractual guarantees concerning subjects governed by statute are superfluous so long
as the statute remains in force, 1 8 and, as the Pfile court's invocation
112 Dodge v. Board of Educ. 302 U.S. 74, 78 (1937); see Indiana ex rel. Anderson v.
Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 104 (1938). Both cases involved attacks on state legislation under the
contract clause. In cases in which the Court has found congressional legislation abrogating
government contracts violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment, the contracts have been expressly authorized by statute. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330,
346-47 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 576 (1934).
"13 Possible examples of such provisions are 10 U.S.C. § 679 (1970), which provides for
"active duty agreements" by which members of reserve components serve on active duty
for extended periods, and 10 U.S.C. §§ 4348, 6959, 9348 (1970), which require cadets at
the service academies to sign "agreements."
"14 With the exception of 32 U.S.C. § 304 (1970), which provides that "[e]ach person
enlisting in the National Guard shall sign an enlistment contract . . .," no statutory
provision expressly refers to "enlistment contracts." Although there are significant differences between enlistment in the National Guard and in other reserve components, see
Johnson v. Powell, 414 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir. 1969), it is difficult to understand why
enlistment in the National Guard should create a contractual relationship if enlistment
in other reserve components does not.
115 E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 3012 (1970).
116 Id. § 503.
117 For example, in Morse v. Boswell, 289 F. Supp. 812 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd per curiam,
401 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1052 (1968), discussed at note 99 supra,
the alleged contract with the enlistee concerned the procedure by which the President
may activate reserve units to deal with an international crisis, a matter governed by 10
U.S.C. § 673(a) (1970).
118 The enlistee can simply bring an action to enforce the statute, such as an action
in the Court of Claims to collect the pay and allowances prescribed by 37 U.S.C. § 204
(1970). See, e.g., Sofranoff v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 470 (1964); Clackum v. United
States, 148 Ct. CI. 404 (1960).
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of the war power indicates, virtually worthless as soon as the statute is
amended.
One factor, however, militates in favor of treating as contractual
the statute-paraphrasing provisions of the reserve component statements
of understanding. The documents and provisions are at present so
ambiguous that a potential enlistee may be induced to enlist by statements that, he could reasonably believe, limit his reserve obligation."19
Since the armed forces almost certainly do not intend such provisions
to be contractual commitments,'1 20 the problem could be solved most
expeditiously by redrafting the documents to make that fact clear.' 21
B.

Special Enlistment Programs
The courts have also assumed that when a person enlists in one of
the armed services' special enlistment programs, 22 the provisions in
his enlistment documents concerning the special training and duty
assignments he is to receive' 23 are contractual. 24 Unlike the provisions
119 That such a belief would be reasonable is indicated by the fact that during the

flood of litigation that followed the enactment of 10 U.S.C. § 673a (1970), more than two
dozen federal courts accepted the contention that those documents contained contractual
provisions limiting the enlistee's obligations. See Mellinger v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 434,
444-46 (E.D. Pa. 1972), and cases cited therein.
120 For example, the regulation governing the Marine Corps Reserve statement of
understanding provides that the document is "explanatory and not contractual in nature." MCO P. 1100.61C, supra note 1, para. 2340. However, no such explanation appears
in the document itself, Navy-Marine Corps (NAVMC) Form 14080, Statement of Understanding upon Enlistment in the Marine Corps Reserve Six-Month Training Program
(Apr., 1967), and the courts that have dealt with the document have proceeded on the
assumption that its provisions are contractual, Weber v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 491
(E.D. Pa. 1968); Winters v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), affd per
curiam, 390 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968).
121 A clause similar to the following could be added: "The statements in this document are not promises or guarantees of any kind; they merely explain the present law,
which is subject to change at any time by Act of Congress."
122 These special enlistment programs include the Army's Europe Option, AR 601-210,
supra note 2, table 5-8 (change no. 5, Jan. 26, 1970), and Language School Option, id.,
table 5-17; the Navy's Nuclear Field Program, NAVPERS 15838A, supra note 1, art.
B-4111; the Marine Corp's Ground Enlistment Program, Marine Corps Order (MCO)
1130.53C, Ground Enlistment Program (Apr. 6, 1972); and the Air Force's Guaranteed
AFSC Program, ATCM 33-2, supra note 2, table 2-3, and Officer Training School Program, id., para. 5-19.
123 Army, Navy, and Air Force provisions concerning special programs are contained
in the following documents: Department of the Army (DA) Form 3286, Statements for
Enlistment, Part VI; Naval Personnel (NAVPERS) Form 601-13, Administrative Remarks;
Air Force (AF) Form 1114, USAF Enlistment Certificate and Agreement. The name of the
document is entered in the blank in item 54 of Form 4. See note 18 supra. The Marine
Corps provisions are written on Form 4 itself (items 25, 54). For the governing regulations,
see note 2 supra.
124 E.g., Shelton v. Brunson, No. 72-1042 (5th Cir., Aug. 17, 1972); Rehart v. Clark,
448 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1971); Gausmann v. Laird, 422 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1969); Chalfant
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in the reserve component statements of understanding, these provisions
are referred to as "promises" or "guarantees," not only in the enlistment documents, 125 but also in military regulations, 126 recruiting
brochures,'127 and mass media advertising. 28 In addition, they concern
matters such as training and assignment of enlistees that are not governed by statute and that Congress has committed to military dis12 9
cretion.
Although these provisions cannot be viewed as terms in an otherwise
contractual relationship, there is a sound reason for the position that
these provisions, in themselves, constitute a contract between the
enlistee and the government: it is necessary that some remedy be
afforded when special program guarantees are breached, and contractual concepts are useful in framing an appropriate remedy.
1. The Need for Enforcement. Perhaps the central reason for providing a legal remedy for breach of promise is to encourage voluntary
reliance on the kinds of promises that benefit society as a whole.8 0
Thus, for example, promotion of reliance on private commercial
promises is necessary in an economic system that depends largely on
free exchange rather than governmental compulsion for the distribution of resources.813 The promotion of reliance on the promises of
v. Laird, 420 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1969); Bemis v. Whalen, 341 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Cal.
1972); Colden v. Asmus, 322 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D. Cal. 1971); Matzelle v. Pratt, 332 F. Supp.
1010 (E.D. Va. 1971).
125 See, e.g., Air Force (AF) Form 1114, USAF Enlistment Certificate and Agreement
(Oct., 1971): "The Air Force guarantees my initial classification and assignment in AF
Specialty Code (AFSC)
. I understand and agree that if through no fault of
my own I am disqualified for entrance into training for this AFSC, I may elect in writing
to complete my enlistment in another AFSC for which qualified or be immediately discharged."
128 See, e.g., ATCM 33-2 supra note 2, para. 2-14(g)(3), which describes the Air Force's
Guaranteed AFSC Program: "The Air Force guarantees job assignment prior to enlistment, formal technical training, and choice of initial duty assignment upon completion
of training." Since the regulations expressly authorize recruiters to make such guarantees,
their enforcement is not impeded by the actual authority doctrine. See note 64 supra.
When recruiters make guarantees that are not authorized by the regulations, the problem can be viewed as one of misrepresentation. See text at notes 68-98 supra.
127 E.g., "You can now enlist in the Air Force and be guaranteed that you will have
the job you want." Directorate of Advertising, USAF Recruiting Service, Additional Guaranteed Jobs in the United States Air Force 3 (1972) (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., NEwswEEK, May 15, 1972, at 71; LwE, May 19, 1972, at 29.
129 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3012(e), 8012(e) (1970).
130 Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61-62
(1936).
131 "When business agreements are not only made but are also acted on, the division
of labor is facilitated, goods find their way to the places where they are most needed, and
economic activity is generally stimulated." Id. at 61. See also F. KESSLqR & G. GmJmoRE,
CoNTRAars: CAsrS AND MATERIz s 2 (1970).
128
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the government is similarly necessary: to the extent that the government depends on the voluntary action of its citizens, rather than compulsion, to carry out its functions, such as the raising of armies, citizens
must be able to rely on the promises that the government has made to
induce them to act. If conscription is abolished and if the voluntary
action of citizens becomes the sole means of filling the ranks of the
armed services, the need to enforce guarantees made to induce enlistment will be particularly great. Recent studies made for the Department of Defense indicate that such promises would be one of the
primary inducements of enlistment in an all-volunteer armed force. 13 2
The existence of the draft complicates the problem, however, since
a high percentage of enlistees in recent years have probably been
motivated by a desire to avoid conscription. 183 But even under the
bargain theory of consideration, the most stringent test that the courts
employ to determine whether a promise is enforceable,'13 4 voluntary
enlistment constitutes sufficient consideration for the military's enlistment guarantee. 85 The emphasis given such guarantees in the armed
forces' recruiting campaigns indicates that they are "bargained for
and given in exchange" for voluntary enlistment, 3 6 and it can be
182 THE REPORT OF THE PRESEDENT'S CoMMIssIoN oN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE

65 (1970); H. WooL, TE MIrrARY SPEcmxasr 111-15 (1968); Hearings Before the Special
Subcomm. on the Draft of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
12,655-56, 12,658-701 (1970).
13 Hearings on the Review of the Administration and Operation of the Selective Service System, Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9935-36 (1966).
184

0.

HOLMES, THE COMMON L iv

293 (1881);

REsTATEMENT OF CONTRACTs

§ 75 (1932).

The bargain theory has been widely attacked on the ground that it identifies as contractual too narrow a range of promises, IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 193-96 (1963), but
it seems evident that those promises that it does identify should be treated as contracts.
Moreover, this doctrine has been used to identify contractual promises of the government.
E.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 576 (1983); Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 886 (1903).
185 Enlistment cannot be regarded as insufficient consideration on the ground that it
is merely the performance of a preexisting legal duty. See IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 175
(1963). Despite the provisions of 50 U.S.C. App.§ 454 (1970), no legal duty to serve in the
Armed Forces can be said to exist in any realistic sense until an induction order issues.
See United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 862, 863 (9th Cir. 1972), which described the duty
imposed by that statute as "a contingent obligation . . .which ripens into a fixed obligation . . . when the induction order issues." Contra, Note, 18 Am. U.L. REv. 596, 601
(1969). More importantly, the obligations assumed by enlistment differ from those imposed by induction: the enlistee often assumes a term of service for three to six years,
whereas the inductee must serve for only two years. Enlistments in the Navy, for example,
are for four, five, or six years depending on the type of enlistment guarantee offered.
NAVPERS 15838A, supra note 1, art. B-2206. Moreover, a male between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-six may enlist in the Army for two years only if he enlists without
an enlistment guarantee. 32 C.F.R. § 571.3 (1972).
13n RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACrs § 75 (1932). Enlistment can, perhaps, most accurately
be viewed as consent to, "the creation ... of a legal relation." Id. § 75(l)(c).
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assumed that the military would not offer a particular guarantee to
13 7
an enlistee unless it was necessary to induce his enlistment.
A judicial remedy for breach of enlistment guarantees is necessary,
in addition, because of the inadequacy of the administrative remedies
presently available. With the exception of the Army, the armed services have not created specialized administrative machinery to deal
with alleged branches of enlistment guarantees, and, even under the
Army procedure, disputes are resolved by administrative personnel
without formal proceedings. 38 While these procedures should be
exhausted before judicial relief is sought, 189 it is questionable whether
limiting the enlistee to them would satisfy the requirements of due
40
process.1
2. The Utility of the Contract Concept. The proposition that
specialized enlistment guarantees are a source of contractual rights
does not mean that the entire relationship between the military and
an enlistee in a special program becomes contractual simply because
such guarantees are made. Rather, it suggests that the relationship
should be viewed as governed partly by statute, partly by military
rgulation, and partly by contract. This conceptualization of enlistment proves useful whether an enlistee fails to receive the guaranteed
training and assignments because of administrative action, a change in
regulations, or a discrepancy between regulations and the written
terms of the guarantee.
a. Administrative Action. If enlistment were viewed as simply a
status governed by statutes and regulations, judicial remedies for
enlistees who fail to receive guaranteed training or assignments because
of administrative action could be based on the duty of the armed
forces to follow their own regulations. 14 ' But the regulations do not
unequivocally require that an enlistee receive what he has been
137 The bargain theory is based on an assumption that if bargaining occurs, a party
in a free bargaining position, such as the armed services, can protect its own interests.
See Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 CoLux.
L. REv. 576, 598 (1969).

See AR 601-210, supra note 2, para. 5-4.2 (change no. 4, Sept. 17, 1969).
139 Cf. United States ex rel. Norris v. Norman, 296 F. Supp. 1270, 1272 (N.D. In. 1969),
an enlistment case in which the court dispensed with the exhaustion requirement because
"it would be manifestly unfair once again to relegate petitioner to a perhaps non-existent
administrative machinery."
140 If an enlistment guarantee is a contract, a military administrative procedure that
deprives an enlistee of a promised benefit must conform to due process requirements.
See note 152 infra.
141 See note 90 supra.
138
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guaranteed,' and the resolution of disputes is left to the discretion
of administrative personnel. 148 Any judicial relief must, therefore, be
premised on contract principles.
The contract concept suggests at least three forms of relief: discharge
from the armed forces (rescission), enforcement of the guarantee
(specific performance), and damages. The damages remedy would probably involve insuperable problems of valuation. 44 Discharge on a writ
of habeas corpus 45 is, however, an effective and justifiable remedy if
the guarantee cannot be kept and if it is assumed that the enlistee
would not have entered the armed forces without it. Contrary to a
recent suggestion, 146 such a remedy is not barred by the decision of the
Supreme Court in Orloff v. Willoughby, 47 in which the Court refused
to review military duty orders. If an enlistment guarantee constitutes
a valid contract, Orloff's holding that discretionary military action is
unreviewable' 48 is inapplicable, because administrative action ceases
142 E.g., Ak 601-210, supra note 2, para. 5-4.1 (change no. 4, Sept. 17, 1969): "Every
effort will be made to scrupulously honor all promises made at the time of enlistment or
reenlistment. Enlistment commitments will be met . . . by following established procedures for reporting and assigning individuals enlisted for an option . ..
143 See note 138 supra.
144 Fuller and Perdue's analysis of contract damages, Fuller & Perdue, supra note 130,
at 66, suggests three measures of damages: the enlistee's expectation interest-the value
of the promised benefit (such as computer training); the enlistee's reliance interest-the
cost to the enlistee of his actual service in the military; and the enlistee's restitution interest-the value of the enlistee's actual service (which is already protected by the enlistee's statutory claim for pay and allowances, see note 118 supra). Measurement of the
expectation interest involves placing an objective value on such promised benefits as assignment in Europe rather than in a combat zone; whereas measurement of the reliance
interest requires both a determination of what portion of the enlistee's total cost is allocable to the contractual benefits (promised benefits) as opposed to the statutory benefits
(pay and allowances), and a valuation of the enlistee's loss of liberty and forfeiture of
constitutional rights. See notes 95-96 supra.
145 In Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 492 (1971), the Supreme Court expressly left
open the question "whether, if petitioner be right in contending that his contract of enlistment was breached, habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy." The basis for such relief is that retention in the armed forces in violation of the terms of an enlistment
guarantee constitutes unlawful custody.
146 In United States ex rel. Lewis v. Laird, 337 F. Supp. 118, 120 (S.D. Ill. 1972), petitioner sought discharge from the Army Reserve on a writ of habeas corpus on the ground
that his enlistment contract had been breached. The court found no breach, but went
on to say: "It seems doubtful that the extraordinary remedy sought would ever be available to obtain judicial review of an alleged breach by the Army of the provisions of a
contract of enlistment. See Orloff v. Willoughby, supra." Contra, Bemis v. Whalen, 341
F. Supp. 1289, 1291 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
147 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
148 In Orloff, the Court dismissed the petition of a psychiatrist conscripted under the
Doctors Draft Act, who sought discharge on the ground that he had been assigned duties,
not as a doctor, but as a medical laboratory technician. The Court held that the statute
required only that Orloff be assigned to duties within "medical and allied specialist
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to be discretionary to the extent that it is governed by contract, as
well as by statute or regulation. Specific enforcement of the guarantee, 149 the second possible remedy, would often have the same practical
effect as discharge, because the statutes and regulations governing discharge provide that the armed forces may terminate an enlistment at
any time for the convenience of the government. 1 0 Thus, if a court
orders specific performance, the armed forces can discharge the enlistee
rather than comply.
b. Changes in Regulations. The principle that the armed services
must follow their own regulations' 5 ' cannot serve as a basis for judicial
relief when regulations are changed to conflict with an enlistment
guarantee. If, however, the guarantee is regarded as a contract, it can
be argued that under the fifth amendment due process clause a change
in regulations cannot deprive an enlistee of his contractual rights. 152
In Winters v. United States,'r3 the court considered at length the effect
of a change in regulations on the provisions of an enlistment document.
Since the case did not involve a special program guarantee, it is doubtful that the enlistment provision with which it dealt should be
considered contractual; 15 but the court proceeded on the assumption
that it was.
The plaintiff in Winters had enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve,
at which time he signed a statement of understanding that required
him to attend 90 percent of all drills scheduled in each year. A subsequent regulation increased the requirement to 100 percent of all
categories": since Orloff had been assigned to duties within these general categories, his
particular assignment was discretionary and unreviewable. See Cortright v. Resor, 447
F.2d 245, 254 n.11 (2d Cir. 1971); Glazier v. Hackel, 440 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1971).

149 For a discussion of the jurisdictional bases for such relief, see Hansen, supra note
95, at 4009 (habeas corpus treated as application for mandamus); Hansen, The Jurisdictional Bases of Federal Court Review of Denials of Administrative Discharges from the
Military II, 4 S.S.L.R. 4001 (mandamus), 4005 (injunctive relief).
150 10 U.S.C. 1169 (1970); 32 C.F.R. § 41.6(b)(5) (1972). If the discharge is honorable,
the enlistee need not be afforded a hearing. 32 C.F.R. § 41.4(a)(2) (1972); see Keef v.
United States, 185 Ct. Cl.454 (1968). But see Geiger v. Brown, 419 F.2d 714, 716-19 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
151 See note 90 supra.
152 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1933).
153 281 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 390 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 896 (1968); accord, Weber v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Pa.

1968).
154

The provision in the Marine Corps Reserve statement of understanding para-

phrased a regulation. Like the special program guarantees, the provision concerned a
matter committed to the discretion of the armed forces, see Schatten v. United States,
419 F.2d 187, 189 n.2 (6th Cir. 1969); unlike those guarantees, however, it was not clearly
held out as an inducement to enlist.
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drills. The enlistee thereupon sought a declaratory judgment that the
new requirement violated his enlistment contract and deprived him
of contractual rights without due process. The district court agreed
that the new requirement violated the contract 55 but held that the
breach was permissible because the amendment was within the Marine
Corps's statutory authority. The Second Circuit affirmed. 156 It appears,
however, that the district court completely ignored the enlistee's claim
that the new regulation violated, not the statute, but his contract.
Alternatively, the court may have been applying to the regulation the
same loose standard of review that is generally applied when statutes
157
are challenged on substantive due process grounds.
Because of the difficulties involved in balancing the needs of national
defense against individual interest, the courts should not pay the same
deference to military judgments, expressed in regulations, as they do
to the judgment of Congress. The armed forces, as immediate parties
to enlistment contracts, are less disinterested than Congress,5 8 and
the regulations promulgated by them are perhaps less thoroughly
considered-at least as to their effects on individual enlistees-than
legislation Congress has passed. 59 There may be situations in which
the interests of national defense require that retroactive regulations be
allowed to abrogate the terms of enlistment contracts. The courts
should, however, carefully scrutinize any claim by the military that
such a necessity exists.
c. Discrepancy between the Guarantee and the Regulations. The
155 281 F. Supp. 289, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
156 390 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
157 For the rational basis test, see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1933). In Winters, petitioner's other claim involved a due
process attack on the retroactive application of 10 U.S.C. § 673a (1970), but the court
made no effort to separate the two claims or to treat them differently.
158 One commentator has suggested that in the gold clause cases, Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), and Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935),
the Court took a "stricter view" of congressional abrogation of federal government contracts than of private contracts because of "a feeling that it is more unfair to permit a
party to a contract to modify its terms than for the legislature, as a disinterested body,
to alter the rights created by a contract between private parties." Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REy. 692,
723 (1960). The armed forces, as immediate parties to enlistment contracts, are even less
disinterested than Congress.
159 The congressional procedure, which includes hearings and debate, insures that a
wider range of views will be considered than does the armed forces procedure. The latter is exempt from provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, that provide that an
agency "give interested persons an opportunity to participate in ... rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments .
5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1), (c), (d), (e)
(1970).
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case of Rehart v. Clark16 0 exemplifies another situation in which the
principle that the armed forces must follow their own regulations
would be an ineffective basis for judicial relief. In Rehart an enlistee
in the Navy's Nuclear Field Program was required to sign a document
that extended the ordinary four-year tern of enlistment by two years.
The document stated: "REASON FOR EXTENSION. Training
(Nuclear Field Program-BUPERSINST 1306.64 Series.. .). I understand that this extension agreement becomes binding upon completion
of IC, EM and MM Class 'A' Schools .

.

. and thereafter may not be

16 1

cancelled .... '
When his original four-year term of enlistment expired, the enlistee
sought to be discharged on the ground that, since he had completed
only one of the three schools specified in the document, his agreement
to extend was not binding. The Navy, however, refused to discharge
him because, contrary to the statement in the enlistment agreement, a
Navy regulation provided that extensions of this sort become binding
162
upon completion of only one school.
The district court granted a writ of habeas corpus. The Ninth
Circuit reversed, arguing that the Navy regulation was "automatically
a part of the contract" because it had the force and effect of law and
because "existing laws are read into contracts in order to fix the rights
and obligations of the parties."' 6 3 This argument is simply another
way of stating the conclusion that when statutes and regulations conflict with the terms of a contract, the statutes and regulations prevail.
While this conclusions may often be sound with respect to conflicts
between statutes and the terms of contracts between private parties,
it is not justifiable with respect to a conflict between regulations
promulgated by a military service and the terms of an agreement that
the service has made. Since the service prescribes the contents of both
the regulations and its agreements, it should have the responsibility
for ensuring that the two do not conflict.
The Ninth Circuit's decision, however, was not necessarily based
on these broad grounds. The court also held that the district court
had erred in invoking the parol evidence rule and in refusing to
admit the regulation in evidence to help in interpreting the enlistment agreement. The regulation indicates that, in fact, the enlistment
160 448 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1971); accord, Colden v. Asmus, 322 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D. Cal.
1971).
161 448 F.2d at 172.
162 Bureau of Personnel Instruction (BUPERSINST) 1306.64E (April 13, 1966), which
was referred to in the extension document. See text at note 161 supra.
163 448 F.2d 170, 173.
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agreement contained a typographical error: it should have read "IC,
EM or MM Class 'A' Schools." An enlistee who had received counselling and information concerning the Nuclear Field Program would
probably have been aware that he would attend only one of these
schools.1 64 Although the Ninth Circuit did not mention these facts, they
suggest that its decision conforms to the adhesion contract principle
that courts should read enlistment documents as they would reasonably
be read by enlistees. Thus, if the Navy could establish that, in view
of the information he had received concerning the Nuclear Field
Program, it would have been unreasonable for Rehart to believe that
he would attend all three schools, the provision in his extension agreement would not be given effect. 165
3. Breaches by the Enlistee. It is doubtful that the contract concept
should be used to fashion a remedy for the armed services against enlistees in special programs who violate their enlistment agreements.
In McCullough & Joy v. Seamans,166 the Air Force sought damages
from an Air Force Academy graduate on the ground that, by obtaining
a conscientious objector discharge, he had breached his agreement to
remain in the service for five years in return for his free education.
Although the cadet undoubtedly violated the provisions of the document he had signed, there is little basis for regarding that document as
a contract since it merely paraphrased the governing statutes. 167 The
court, however, placed its decision on broader grounds and, without
164 The regulation is discussed in Colden v. Asmus, 322 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D. Cal.
1971). See also U.S. Recruiting Aids Division, (RAD) 69118, The Navy Nuclear Program
9-10 (April 1, 1969). The schools are not successive schools in a single career field but
are the initial schools in three different career fields.
165 Alternatively the problem could have been viewed as one of misrepresentation. See
text at notes 68-98 supra. Since relief for misrepresentations to enlistees should not depend on the presence of an intent to mislead (which certainly was absent in Rehart), and
since misrepresentations can be written as well as verbal, the primary inquiry would have
been the same as under the contract of adhesion approach, that is, whether the enlistee
relied on the typographical error.
166 5 S.S.L.R. 3647 (E.D. Cal. 1972).
167 See Air Force Academy Form 205, Statement of Understanding. Cadets, unlike enlistees in special programs, are governed by a highly particularized statutory scheme and
are generally regarded as occupying a unique military status. See Hoppel v. United States,
85 F.2d 237, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 557 (1936); United States v. Ellman, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 549, 26 C.M.R. 829 (1957); Zbar & Mazza, Legal Status of Cadets, 7
USAF JAG L. REv., Nov.-Dec., 1965, at 31. There is an express statutory requirement
that cadets "sign an agreement ... to accept an appointment and serve as a commisioned
officer of the Regular Air Force for at least five years," 10 U.S.C. § 9348(a)(2) (1970), but
since there are statutory consequences for failing to fulfill the "agreement," 10 U.S.C.
§ 9348(b) (1970), the document should be regarded, not as a contract, but as a written
consent which is necessary to render the statutory scheme operative.
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discussing the document involved, simply held that a contractual
remedy was an inappropriate solution to the problem. 68 Indeed, the
opinion suggests that the armed forces probably should not be afforded
a contractual remedy even when enlistees violate provisions that can
be regarded as contractual. As the court argued, the contract concept
is a clumsy device for fashioning a remedy'6 9 and is unnecessary since
the government, unlike the enlistee, can provide its own remedy by
enacting statutes and regulations.
CONCLUSION

The contract concept is of limited usefulness in resolving disputes
between enlistees and the armed forces. Enlistment can best be viewed,
not as the making of a contract, but as an administrative procedure
that results in a restriction of liberty and the loss of certain constitutional rights. Ordinarily that procedure establishes a relationship
governed entirely by regulations, statutes, and constitutional requirements. It cannot usefully be conceptualized as contractual. When,
however, specific guarantees are made to induce enlistment, it is
possible to consider them as a kind of contract-a view that may
facilitate their enforcement by the courts. To resolve disputes concerning such enlistment guarantees, the courts should look to adhesion contract or sui generis enlistment contract principles rather than to the
rules of general contract theory.
William P. Casella
168 The court argued that the problem was "far too involved for simple contract
principles to settle," and that it warranted a congressional solution. 5 S.S.L.R. at 3648.
Compare Miller v. Chafee, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1972), 5 S.S.L.R. 3575, rev'g 324 F. Supp.
1344 (D. Hawaii 1971), which rejected a similar claim on the questionable ground that
to require that an enlistee discharged as a conscientious objector repay the cost of his
education would impair the exercise of a first amendment right. See Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971); Turpin v. Resor, 452 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1971).
169 The court pointed out that "a suit for damages is hardly the medium for resolving
the problem" and that a more effective remedy would be to require alternative civilian
service, a remedy difficult to fashion through an application of contract principles. 5
S.S.L.R. at 3648. The damages remedy would also entail difficult problems of valuation.
See Miller v. Chafee, 324 F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (D. Hawaii 1971), rev'd, - F.2d (9th
Cir. 1972), 5 S.S.L.R. 3575, in which, after allowing that remedy, the court added that it
"offer[ed] no opinion as to what might be an appropriate measure of damages." Another
contract remedy, specific performance of the agreement to serve in the armed forces,
would be inappropriate in many situations in which it is desirable that the enlistee be
discharged (such as when he has become disabled, or a conscientious objector). A third

contract remedy, rescission, would be completely ineffective unless it were accompanied
by an action for damages.

